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OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE TWILIGHT OF BUCKLEY 
ROBERT F. BAUER†
INTRODUCTION 
This Article analyzes the component parts of “judicial deference” 
as set out in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,1 and assesses their 
interrelationship and persuasiveness.  Part I locates McConnell within 
the history of struggles over the proper role of courts and legislatures 
in the constitutional design and oversight of campaign finance con-
trols.  It attempts to show how the Court could not settle on a consis-
tent account of its role, or Congress’s, in the application of the ration-
ale in Buckley v. Valeo2 for controlling campaign finance.  With the 
advent of McConnell, the Court seeks to construct a way out for itself, 
built around Congressional “expertise” in striking the required consti-
tutional balance. 
Part II more fully evaluates the theory of judicial deference articu-
lated by the McConnell Court, with particular reference to the Court’s 
uses of:  1) history; 2) the notion of legislative “expertise;” 3) appeals 
to “political realities;” and 4) Congress’s imperative need, in light of 
those realities, to address actual or predicted circumvention.  This 
construction of deference suffers from an internal conflict that even-
tually undermines its persuasiveness:  it functions as an escape from 
the rigors of Buckley, but at the same time Buckley, and more specifi-
cally the assumed exclusivity of the corruption rationale, defines its 
theoretical limits.  The Court must ground its justification of defer-
 † Robert F. Bauer is a partner in the law firm of Perkins Coie LLP and Chairman of 
its Political Law Group.  I am grateful to Donna Lovecchio for expert research assis-
tance, and to Professor Richard Hasen and my colleague Ezra Reese for comments on 
previous drafts. 
1 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
2 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
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ence in narrow and highly debatable claims about history, political 
realities and the nature of legislative expertise as they relate, and only 
as they relate, to the problem of corruption.  The deference theory 
therefore stands and falls on the nature of these shaky historical and 
empirical claims.  In this light, Part II also attempts to explain the 
Court’s neglect of the legislative history of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).3
I.  FROM BUCKLEY BACK TO BURROUGHS, VIA MCCONNELL 
The Court’s opinion in McConnell is effectively tucked between 
two citations to Burroughs v. United States.4  In 1934, the Burroughs 
Court endorsed a broad reading of congressional authority to “pre-
serve the purity of presidential and vice presidential elections,”5 con-
cluding that Congress possesses the power to “safeguard” elections 
“from the improper use of money.”6  The McConnell Court, at the be-
ginning of its lengthy opinion, cites this particular portion of the Bur-
roughs opinion:  “the choice of means to that end [protecting against 
improper financial activity in elections] presents a question primarily 
addressed to the judgment of Congress.”7  The Burroughs Court had 
elaborated still more on this theme, as follows: 
If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain 
the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce 
to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means adopted 
and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination 
alone.
8
The McConnell Court’s attention to Burroughs does not appear to 
be a mere attachment to florid early twentieth century judicial rheto-
ric.  For with its reference to Burroughs, opening and closing its analy-
sis of the congressional role in establishing the constitutional bounda-
ries of campaign finance, the Court unmistakably suggests that it is 
striking out in a new—or, considering the age of Burroughs, a very 
old—direction.  What follows confirms first impressions.  An under-
standing of how significantly McConnell alters the relations of the judi-
 3 Pub. L. No. 107-171, 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a) 
(Supp. 2003)). 
4 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
5 Id. at 544. 
6 Id. at 545. 
7 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 644 (citing Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 547). 
8 Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 547-48. 
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cial and legislative branches requires some attention to how these re-
lations were treated, explicitly or implicitly, in Buckley and its progeny. 
A.  Judicial Deference in Buckley and Its Aftermath 
Buckley did not simply rest on broad declarations about which 
campaign finance matters were best left to “congressional determina-
tion alone.”9  Like the McConnell Court, the Buckley Court did not chal-
lenge Congress’s baseline authority to regulate federal elections.10  
And the Buckley Court, in its discussion of that authority as it affects 
the regulation of presidential and vice presidential elections, also cites 
to Burroughs.11  Yet the manner in which it developed its position was 
distinctly unBurroughs-like.  The Buckley Court strove to develop a rela-
tively complex constitutional architecture, articulating general princi-
ples to guide the courts in the conduct of judicial review.12  Most cen-
trally, this judicial framework included the acceptance of the 
constitutional sufficiency of one “compelling interest” asserted by the 
government, but also the rejection of two others.  Working from the 
anticorruption interest that the court of appeals recognized as “com-
pelling,”13 the Supreme Court drew a distinction between “contribu-
tions” and “expenditures” that conflicted with a congressional scheme 
of limits on both.14
Even as the Buckley Court sustained the congressional position and 
upheld the limits on contributions as consistent with First Amend-
ment guarantees, it did not do so in deference to empirical congres-
9 See id. at 548 (emphasizing Congress’s particular expertise in selecting the best 
means to protect federal elections (citing Stephens v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 272 
(1932)). 
10 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13 (stating that Congress’s constitutional power to regu-
late federal elections is well established). 
11 See id. at 14 (citing Burroughs generally as a recognition of Congress’s power to 
legislate in connection with federal elections). 
12 See id. at 14-23 (discussing when financial transactions include elements of 
speech protected by the First Amendment and when important government interests 
may justify regulating that speech). 
13 Id. at 10 (citing the lower court’s decision, 519 F.2d 817, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). 
14 Noting the costs of modern communication, which rise with the size of the tar-
get audience and the number of issues discussed, the Court found that limiting “ex-
penditures” would pose significant restraints on free speech by reducing the “quantity 
of expression.”  Id. at 19.  On the other hand, restricting “contributions” would only be 
a slight restraint on free speech since the expression is dependent almost entirely on 
the act of giving, rather than the quantity of the gift.  Id. at 20-21. 
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sional judgment about the practical effects of such controls. 15  The 
Court arrived at its own conclusions:  “There is no indication . . . that 
[limits on contributions] would have any dramatic adverse effect on 
the funding of campaigns and political associations.”16  Similarly, the 
Court set out its own assessment of the impact of these finance restric-
tions on challengers.17  The references the Court does make to con-
gressional judgments are brief and indiscriminately stated, not ex-
panded into a coherent statement of the relative role of the two 
branches in the construction of constitutional campaign finance con-
trols.  For example, over three pages, the Court states that 
“Congress could legitimately conclude” that avoidance of the appear-
ance of corruption was critical to public confidence in government;
18
 
that 
“Congress was surely entitled to conclude” that disclosure could not 
alone address this appearance problem;
19
 and that 
“Congress was justified” in concluding that prophylactic measures, 
reaching some contributions not corrupt in purpose or effect, were 
nonetheless required to guard against corruption.
20
In the first instance, Congress’s conclusion was judged to be “le-
gitimate,” which is not an expression of judicial deference.  In the 
second instance, Congress is said to be “entitled” to its conclusion 
about the inadequacy of disclosure in addressing corruption, although 
the basis on which it is so entitled, and the scope of the entitlement, 
are unstated.  And finally, in stating that Congress was “justified” in 
the adoption of prophylactic measures, the Court is suggesting that 
Congress’s position was reasonable—reasonable, that is, as the Court 
15 The Court endorsed the government’s “primary” interest in preventing corrup-
tion, or its appearance, associated with large unregulated political donations.  The 
government had also argued for contribution limits on the basis of “ancillary interests” 
in the “relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections” and in limiting 
“skyrocketing” campaign costs.  Id. at 25-26.  Rejecting the “ancillary interest” in politi-
cal equality as a basis for limiting independent expenditures, the Court famously re-
pudiated “the concept that Government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others . . . .”  Id. at 48-49. 
16 Id. at 21. 
17 See id. at 32-33 (finding that contribution limits would not discriminate against 
challengers as a class because challengers are often well-known politicians with the 
ability to accumulate sizable campaign coffers). 
18 Id. at 27. 
19 Id. at 28. 
20 Id. at 30. 
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has independently judged the matter upon review of the record and 
examination of political realities. 
In any event, the actions of the Court speak for themselves.  The 
Court picked over the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 
1971, as amended,21 steadfastly invalidating expenditure limitations, 
which were of considerable significance to Congress’s overall plan for 
controlling campaign finance.  The Court, in fact, acknowledged the 
meticuluous adjustment it made to Congress’s handiwork.  Declining 
to consider a claim that the “overall effect” of the statute was to pro-
tect incumbents, the Court noted that it need not consider the “full 
sweep of the legislation as enacted” because it had stripped the law of 
key expenditure limitations.22
In the aftermath of Buckley, the Court did not develop a consistent 
theory of appropriate judicial intervention or deference to guide its 
review of congressional campaign finance restrictions.  The Court 
merely attempted, case by case, to determine whether Congress had 
imposed controls consistent with its sole “compelling interest” in the 
prevention of the fact or appearance of corruption.23  In the early 
1980s, the Court seemed to accept that Congress could extend regula-
tion of campaign finance to guard against “circumvention,” even 
where the activities regulated did not present a direct threat, in and of 
themselves, of corruption or its appearance.  In California Medical Ass’n 
v. FEC,24 the Court articulated that era’s version of the “anticircumven-
tion” theory of today:  Congress, it held, could regulate certain activi-
ties as “an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect 
the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld by this Court in 
Buckley.”25  On this basis, the Court sustained a limit on contribu-
tions to a multi-candidate political committee,26 to “supplement” Con-
gress’s more immediate concern with contributions made by such 
committees directly to candidates.27  Later, in FEC v. National Right to 
21Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-
455 (2002)). 
22 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 n.33. 
23 See id. at 26-27, 45, 53 (1975) (finding a “constitutionally sufficient justification” 
in the purpose of limiting “the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from 
large individual financial contributions”). 
24 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
25 Id. at 199. 
26 Id. at 201 (upholding “the $5,000 limitation on the amount that persons 
may contribute to multicandidate political committees” contained in 2 U.S.C.  
§ 441a(a)(1)(c)). 
27 Id. at 201. 
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Work Committee (NRWC),28 the Court sustained Congress’s adoption of 
a “prophylactic” rule that prohibited a membership organization’s use 
of corporate funds to solicit contributions for its political action 
committee, which was established to make direct contributions to 
candidates.29
Only a few years later, the Court appeared to retreat somewhat 
from its constitutional blessing of useful enforcement supplements 
and “bright-line” rules to support Congress’s anticorruption mission. 
In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),30 the Court re-
jected an appeal by the FEC for a bright-line rule in enforcing the 
corporate spending prohibition31 against a nonprofit right-to-life or-
ganization that financed the production and distribution of a voting 
record.32  The Court was apparently troubled by the facts, most nota-
bly the ideological character of the “corporation” that funded its ac-
tivities on a modest scale with only individual contributions.33  The 
Court then designed an exception, dramatically legislative in charac-
ter, for independent election-related spending by certain types of 
nonprofit ideological corporations.34  Congress had made no such dis-
tinction.  In fact, section 44lb of FECA,35 by its terms, reflects an 
awareness of the different types of corporations, such as national 
banks and corporations chartered by act of Congress.  Congress did 
not elect to include any exemption of the kind crafted by the Court in 
MCFL. 
The Court was similarly suspicious of the limitation imposed by 
Congress on independent expenditures in support of publicly funded 
presidential candidates.  In FEC v. National Conservative PAC 
28 459 U.S. 197 (1982). 
29 Id. at 210. 
30 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
31 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds to make 
expenditures “in connection with” any federal election and requiring that any expen-
diture for such purpose be financed by voluntary contributions to a separate segre-
gated fund). 
32 MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263. 
33 Id. at 264 (noting that the organization was “formed for the express purpose of 
promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities,” and that it was the 
organization’s “policy not to accept contributions from” business corporations or labor 
unions). 
34 Id. at 264 n.13 (“Our decision today merely states that a corporation that does 
not have persons affilliated financially must fall outside of § 441b’s prohibition on di-
rect expenditures if it also has the other two characteristics possessed by MCFL that we 
discuss in text.”). 
35 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 
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(NCPAC),36 the Court rejected what it dismissed as “a hypothetical 
possibility” of quid pro quo corruption37 associated with independent 
expenditures by well-connected and well-funded groups with ties to a 
presidential candidate’s campaign.38  The Court also affirmed the dis-
trict court’s rejection of the proffered evidence consisting of public 
opinion polling data that purported to show that these types of ex-
penditures would compound public cynicism about the role of money 
in politics—that is, the appearance of corruption.39
MCFL and NRWC could be viewed as a logical extension of the 
Buckley command that the Court take special care to review congres-
sional limits on expenditures.  The mid-l990s brought another exam-
ple of this kind, when the Court considered an enforcement action 
brought under the party “coordinated spending limitations.”40  In the 
first Colorado Republican case,41 the Court concluded that parties could 
spend without limitation on behalf of their candidates so long as they 
did so “independently.”42  None of the parties in the case had offered 
this theory, and FEC regulations had flatly precluded “independence” 
of a candidate from his or her own party.43  Swayed by the fact that the 
party’s spending occurred prior to the nomination of, or in coordina-
tion with, a candidate,44 the Court found no basis for a potential of 
“corruption” that would justify the application of limits.45  Any such 
suggestion of “corruption,” the Court claimed, was too “attenuated.”46  
The Court was untroubled by any prospect of “circumvention,” 
through claims of “independence” of the coordinated spending lim-
36 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
37 The Court defined quid pro quo corruption as “dollars for political favors.”  Id. 
at 497; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1975) (“To the extent that large 
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential 
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is under-
mined.”). 
38 NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 498. 
39 Id. at 499-500. 
40 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (subjecting, ordinarily, a party’s coordinated expendi-
tures to the $5000 limitation).  Coordinated expenditures are defined as “expenditures 
made . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at, the request or sugges-
tion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents.”  2 U.S.C. § 
441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
41 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican I)., 518 
U.S. 604 (1996)  
42 Id. at 608. 
43 11 C.F.R. § 109.32 (2004) (defining “coordinated party expenditure limits”). 
44 Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 614. 
45 Id. at 616. 
46 Id. 
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its.47  Neither direct application of the anticorruption rationale, nor 
the anticircumvention theory advanced by cases like California Medical 
Ass’n, could save the spending limitation at issue in the case.48
 
B.  McConnell Foreshadowed:  The Shrink Missouri and Colorado 
Republican II Cases 
The turn of the century brought about a distinctive turn in the 
Court’s post-Buckley jurisprudence—a turn away from Buckley and to-
ward a new articulation of the role of the Court and of the legislature.  
The Court made much of deference to legislative judgments in Nixon 
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.49  In Shrink Missouri, the plaintiffs 
had challenged the limit established by the Missouri legislature for 
contributions to candidates, which ranged from $275 to $1075 accord-
ing to the office sought.50  Their complaint was that the state had 
made no effort to support the limits with evidence of potential cor-
ruption or its appearance.51  Yet the Court, acknowledging that Mis-
souri did not preserve legislative history, decided the case on defer-
ence to the legislative judgment about the need for limits and their 
amounts.52  The Court returned to the NCPAC case, citing it for the 
proposition that it would not “second-guess a legislative determination 
as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil 
feared.”53  While the legislature would presumably have to have some 
grounds for the imposition of limits, the “quantum” of such evidence 
“will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justifica-
tion raised.”54  The Court insisted that Buckley had not established a 
minimum requirement of any kind.55  In the case at hand, the Court 
concluded, the personal views of a legislator and an assortment of 
47 Id. at 617-18. 
48 See id. (declining to find that “a limitation on political parties’ independent ex-
penditures is necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral 
system”). 
49 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
50 Id. at 383. 
51 Id. at 390-91. 
52 Id. at 393-94. 
53 Id. at 391 n.5 (citing NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982)). 
54 Id. at 391. 
55 Id. at 397 (“In Buckley, we specifically rejected the contention that $1,000, or any 
other amount, was a constitutional minimum below which legislatures could not regu-
late.”). 
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newspaper articles reflecting allegations of public corruption amply 
supported the state enactment.56
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Gins-
burg, more fully developed the theory of “deference” on which the re-
sult rested.  In a statement that foreshadowed the McConnell majority’s 
jurisprudence, Justice Breyer suggested that the legislature had a role 
in establishing the “difficult” balance between “constitutionally pro-
tected interests . . . on both sides of the legal equation.”57  The legisla-
ture could claim that role on the basis of its “expertise”:  “Where a leg-
islature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as for example, 
in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to em-
pirical legislative judgments—at least when that deference does not 
risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate 
themselves from effective electoral challenge.”58
Breyer did not say more about the source of the expertise, except 
to state that “the legislature understands the problem—the threat to 
electoral integrity, the need for democratization—better than do we.  
We should defer to its political judgment that unlimited spending 
threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”59  Justice Breyer sug-
gested that this doctrine was compatible with the Court’s holding in 
Buckley,60 though this is doubtful.  Moreover, it is striking that Breyer 
would refer to Congress’s recognition of the threat of unlimited 
“spending,” when it was precisely “spending” limits that the Buckley 
Court had found to require the closest judicial scrutiny. 
The question of the viability of Buckley’s distinction between con-
tributions and expenditures, in the light of notions of “deference” to 
Congress, was raised again the following year.  The Court upheld 
the “coordinated” party spending limits against a facial challenge, with 
Justice Souter once again writing for the majority.61  The Court rejected 
the significance of the contribution/expenditure distinction for the 
resolution of the case, and the manner in which it did so previews the 
McConnell view of the world.  The Court in Colorado Republican II in-
56 Id. at 393-94. 
57 Id. at 399-400 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 402. 
59 Id. at 403-04. 
60 See id. at 404-05 (asserting that Buckley “might be interpreted as embodying suf-
ficient flexibility for the problem at hand”). 
61 FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437 (2001) 
(Colorado Republican II). 
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sisted that the distinction was not formal, but “functional.”62  Congress 
was entitled to look behind campaign finance practices to judge their 
corruptive potential or appearance, or their effect on its ability to en-
force the law—to anticipate and address circumvention.  Courts had 
to make room for generally practical approaches to the issues raised 
by campaign finance:  approaches grounded in “political life” and po-
litical reality.63  While not stated specifically, this practicality, even real-
ism, was seen as Congress’s special forte.  Presumably this was the 
source of the expertise justifying judicial deference.64
C.  McConnell and the Triumph of “Deference” 
McConnell wove the themes of Shrink Missouri and Colorado Republi-
can II into a frontally argued theory of deference to the legislative 
branch in matters of campaign finance regulation.  As in Shrink Mis-
souri, legislative history plays virtually no role in the Court’s considera-
tion of Congress’s constitutional purposes.  In fact, the Court notes 
that BCRA was enacted with “little” legislative history.65  The Court 
does not, therefore, ground its deference to Congress on a showing 
Congress made in support of enactment.  The Court defers more broadly 
on the basis of the following four features of Congress’s engagement 
with campaign finance:  history, expertise, political realities, and en-
forcement of the law. 
62 See id. at 438 (“The simplicity of the distinction [between contributing and 
spending] is qualified by [FECA’s] provision for a functional, not formal, definition of 
‘contribution . . . .’”). 
63 See id. at 452 n.14 (noting “Congress’s concern with this reality of political life,” 
that contributors give with an expectation of return). 
64 The Court also placed some emphasis on deference in FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S 
146 (2003), decided only months before McConnell, in which it sustained the constitu-
tionality of the prohibition on corporate contributions as applied to contributions by 
nonprofit advocacy corporations.  Yet this case turned more narrowly on the specific 
doctrine supporting restrictions on corporate political activity.  See id. at 155 (“In sum, 
our cases on campaign finance regulation represent respect for the ‘legislative judg-
ment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly 
careful regulation.’” (quoting NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982)).  Moreover, the 
Court stressed that its holding took into account the Buckley distinction between con-
tributions and expenditures.  See id. at 161-62 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 
(1976) (per curiam)).  As explained in this Part, the more broadly gauged doctrine of 
deference emerging from Shrink Missouri and Colorado Republican II, and brought to full 
muster in McConnell, operates to dissolve the distinction between the two. 
65 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 681. 
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1.  History 
The McConnell opinion opens with a review of Congress’s history 
of amendment over the course of the last century of the federal cam-
paign finance laws.66  While Congress may now be enacting broad 
controls on soft money, these actions, as the Court views them, must 
be seen as incremental steps, resulting in “steady improvement” over a 
period of years.67  In this sense, it appears that Congress has earned 
the measure of deference offered:  it has proceeded cautiously and re-
sponsibly, systematically fine-tuning the laws to achieve consistent im-
provement in their effectiveness.  Thus the Court states:  “We respect 
Congress’s decision to proceed in incremental steps in the area of 
campaign finance regulation.”68
2.  Expertise 
In matters of campaign finance, members of Congress are consid-
ered to have “vastly superior knowledge” on topics such as the role of 
parties and their relationship with officeholders.  The court recognized 
this expertise by implementing a heightened rather than strict scru-
tiny standard of review.69
3.  Political Realities 
The consideration of “political realities” appears closely related to 
the expertise attributed to Congress.70  Members of Congress must be 
credited, as political experts, with knowing “how things really work.”  
Yet the Court appears sometimes to offer its own appreciation of “po-
litical realities,” separate and apart from that of the expert class of 
officeholders.  In any event, the focus on political realities serves the 
Court’s purpose in avoiding formalistic distinctions between “contri-
66 See id. at 643-48 (outlining the history of federal campaign finance reform). 
67 Id. at 645. 
68 Id. at 669 (citations omitted). 
69 See id. at 656 n.39 (“[R]egulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and 
political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on 
speech . . . .”). 
70 See, e.g., id. at 665-66 (stating that Congress has a regulatory interest in “realities 
of political fundraising” that may “give rise to corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption”); id. at 674 (affirming “Congress’ judgment that if a large donation is capable 
of putting a federal candidate in the debt of the contributor, it poses a threat of cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption”); id. at 686 (“Congress is fully entitled to 
consider the real-world differences between political parties and interest groups when 
crafting a system of campaign finance regulation.”). 
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butions” and “expenditures,” for, as the Court in Colorado Republican II 
suggested, the line between the one and the other may blur in practi-
cal application or in the cold light of political realities.71
4.  Enforcing the Law by Addressing and  
Anticipating Circumvention 
The Court sees Congress as entitled to enforce its laws by antici-
pating and combating different, evolving, and novel means of cor-
ruption through appropriate measures.  This ground for deference is 
related to the history of congressional involvement with campaign fi-
nance, for Congress has been required to root out all manner of eva-
sion of the law.  In fact, following Colorado Republican II, the Court 
wraps this concern with circumvention into the concern with corrup-
tion.  Citing Colorado Republican II, the McConnell Court finds that “cir-
cumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”72  Congress may attend to 
actual corruption and also act on “predictions” of where it might next 
take place.73
These are the component, and in some ways overlapping, parts of 
the case made by the McConnell Court for judicial deference.  Taken 
together, it can be seen how they support a sharp departure from a 
concern, formal in nature, with the difference between contributions 
and expenditures.  The emphasis on practical politics—on the history 
and “realities” of political life—enables the Court to conclude that soft 
money solicitation and spending limits are an appropriate and even 
necessary means of enforcing contribution limits.  Thus “[a]s with di-
rect limits on contributions, [party and candidate soft money] spend-
ing and solicitation restrictions have only a marginal impact on politi-
cal speech.”74  In this way, contribution and expenditure limits 
become functionally the same.  In this way, also, it can be readily seen 
that the McConnell theory of judicial deference is incompatible with 
Buckley. 
71 Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. 431, 464 (2001). 
72 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 661 (quoting id., at 456). 
73 See id. at 673 (noting that Congress “made a prediction [in enacting FECA § 
323(b)] . . . [h]aving been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire his-
tory of campaign finance regulation . . .”). 
74 Id. at 658.  The Court elsewhere refers to spending and solicitation restrictions 
as “mechanism[s] adopted to implement the contribution limit . . . .”  Id. at 657.  It is 
fair to say that expenditure limits have been knocked off their once high constitutional 
perch when, in this context at least, they are mere enforcement “mechanisms.” 
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II.  EVALUATING MCCONNELL “DEFERENCE” 
A.  The Problems with Deference in a Buckley Framework 
In evaluating McConnell deference, it is helpful in the first instance 
to identify the kind of deference it is not propounding.  The Court 
does not advance the proposition that competing constitutional values 
in campaign finance derive from the First Amendment, with the Court 
charged with monitoring traditional free speech concerns while Con-
gress sought to vindicate that aspect of the Amendment concerned 
with ensuring a more robust democratic dialogue.75  Nor does the 
Court offer a highly developed notion of the democratic implications 
of deference, such as that recently advanced by Richard Hasen.76  In 
Hasen’s version, Congress might lay claim to deference to its vision, 
even a highly contested vision, of the proper balance between equality 
and other constitutional values.77  The Court would remain responsi-
ble for policing the selection of means to achieve this end—screening, 
for example, for evidence of legislative self-interest or other illicit mo-
tives.78  As Professor Hasen sees it, this framework would encourage 
experimentation in the political marketplace.  Errors would be cor-
rected by experience, and Congress would take care with the articula-
tion of means and ends with the knowledge that the courts were 
watching.79
The Court in McConnell eschews any bold strokes of this kind, and 
instead seeks to mold its theory of deference within the space allowed 
by Buckley.  This is a fateful move, leaving the Court with only the anti-
corruption rationale to support its assertion of Congressional author-
ity.  This rationale compromises Congress’s claim to “deference” in a 
way that competing theories, like Hasen’s, do not.  It does so in two 
major respects. 
75 This robust dialogue might consist of a “diversity of views, orderly presentation 
and intelligent deliberation, enhanced opportunities for the self-expression of individ-
ual citizens who lack wealth, and substantial political equality.”  Lillian R. BeVier, 
Money and Politics:  A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1070 (1985) (citations omitted).  It is fair to say that Professor 
BeVier does not think much of this “competing values” analysis, but she correctly iden-
tifies the line of argument advanced by those who do. 
76 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW (2003). 
77 See id. at 101-37 (describing campaign finance as a conflict between equality and 
liberty). 
78 See id. at 102 (promoting a theory of contested political equality measures). 
79 Id. at 117, 119. 
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First, the Court’s appeal to expertise is placed under serious strain 
by the narrow reliance on the anticorruption rationale in proclaimed 
fealty to Buckley.  By definition, officeholders legislating to avert cor-
ruption are addressing their own conduct.  As McConnell notes repeat-
edly, BCRA as an anticorruption statute is concerned with the actions 
of officeholders, in relation to donors and to their parties—the same 
officeholders, that is, who designed the statute.  We normally are 
skeptical of laws designed by those who, seeking to correct their own 
conduct, engage in a form of “self-checking.”  By contrast, in a theory 
of deference grounded, for example, in legislative articulation of 
competing theories of equality, we have politicians doing what they 
are expected to do—expressing a view of democratic participation 
and governance.  While we might be concerned with the possibility of 
covert motives in the execution of this program, the issue of self-
interest does not dramatically dominate the foreground. 
The problem is not simply that, in a critique of their own involve-
ment with political money, officeholders may be tempted to rig the 
game for their own purposes.  There is also the fair possibility that, 
even if they do the best they can, their biases will taint, if not wholly 
disqualify, the effort.  The McConnell plaintiffs made this point by not-
ing that Congress provided special allowances for themselves in soft 
money fundraising that they denied to the parties,80 and by enacting 
higher contribution limits and protections against the misfortune of 
drawing a millionaire opponent.81  Congress may embark on this legis-
lative venture with the best of intentions, only to produce a statute 
that hardly escapes the pull of self-interest.  In these conditions, an 
argument based on “expertise” rings hollow, particularly to the ears of 
political interests and entities adversely affected by the legislative out-
come. 
Second, there is the problem that by grounding deference in the 
Buckley framework, the Court must find a way to expand the concep-
tion of “corruption” or its appearance to accommodate the compre-
hensive range of actions that Congress might consider necessary.  
BCRA is not concerned with vote-buying, or any of the more coarse 
and familiar forms of “sale of office,” but rather corruption that “is 
80 National parties, for example, cannot raise soft money for election-related 
charities, while officeholders can within specially designed limits but without public 
disclosure requirements.  Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441i(d) (denying national parties the abil-
ity to raise soft money for election-related charities), with 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(4) (per-
mitting officeholders to raise soft money for election-related charities). 
81 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 669; see also U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1), 441a(a)(3),441a(i). 
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neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize,” or that is “subtle 
but equally dispiriting.”82  A form of “corruption” that is both “subtle” 
and not “easily detected” presents an elusive target for regulation.  It 
presents the still more immediate question of who, and with what de-
gree of authority, might determine its presence or occurrence.  The 
Court seeks to solve the problem by an appeal to Congress’s exper-
tise—its experience with political reality, demonstrated over time. 
Congress, in effect, earns its right to deference by showing that 
over many years, in a “steady improvement” of the election laws, it has 
displayed a resolute, carefully targeted concern with the corruption 
problem.83  This is the source of its expertise, but more importantly, it 
is also the basis for any reassurance that Congress can rise above the 
lure or trap of self-interestedness.84
This means that the Court’s case for deference rests on its per-
suasiveness, that is, on the power of its presentation of “realities” 
and “history.”  Yet the McConnell Court’s history of Congressional in-
tervention in campaign finance is superficial and incomplete.  The 
Court offers up a sort of heroic “official history” as Congress would 
have written it.  A more probing examination reveals a different his-
tory than the one presented by the Court—one characterized by parti-
san motivations and political self-interest rather than simply “steady 
improvement” in the attack on corruption.85  Moreover, the “political 
realities” within which Congress is operating include a structure of po-
litical competition, barely considered by the Court, that is heavily 
weighted in the interests of, and shaped by, the individual candi-
date—particularly the incumbent candidate. 
82 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 666. 
83 See id. at 643-45 (discussing the history of the election laws and characterizing it 
as Congress’s “steady improvement of the national election laws”). 
84 The Court gives only summary attention to the dissent’s critique of Title I of 
BCRA as a statute that “look[s] very much like an incumbency protection plan.” Id. at 
753 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The majority replies simply that any concern about 
Congress’s self-interest “is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny.”  Id. at 
684 n.72 (majority opinion).  According to the Court, Congress is held in check by 
having to show “concrete evidence” of corruption, or its appearance, arising from “a 
particular type of financial transaction,” and by having to adopt means “closely drawn” 
to solve the problem.  Id.  Of course, the Court’s reassurances are negligible, under-
mined by its decision to “defer” broadly to congressional choices.  The Court’s analysis 
reflects few demands on Congress for “concrete evidence,” in large measure because it 
chooses to defer to the legislature’s “conclusions” and “predictions” about the exis-
tence of corruption and the means of dealing with it.  Id. at 672. 
85 Id. at 645. 
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The nature of this unofficial history and reality bears some atten-
tion because it illuminates the weakness of the foundation on which 
the Court seeks to establish its theory of deference.  This is not to say 
that a theory of deference is not imaginable or sustainable, but that 
the Court’s attempt to construct one in McConnell, in an awkward rela-
tionship to Buckley, does not succeed.  It does not succeed because 
a theory of deference tied to Buckley is doomed from the start.  The 
Court is seeking to escape the imagined rigors of Buckley through a 
theory of deference, but by insisting on operating within the Buckley 
paradigm of the danger of corruption, it builds the theory on a 
theoretical foundation that cannot support it.  In short, the history of 
campaign finance reform is by no means a straightforward history of a 
“resolute” concern with corruption, and that history does not support 
the claims made by McConnell for congressional “expertise.” 
In its analysis of “history” and “political realities,” the Court’s re-
fusal to consider the history of the very enactment under review, 
BCRA, underscores the problems with its theory of judicial deference.  
The Court minimizes interest in the legislative history of BCRA itself, 
declaring that there is “little” of it.86  Yet there is more legislative his-
tory than the Court is willing to admit, spanning weeks of debate in 
the Senate and an intense day and night of debate in the House, and 
it is hard to see how a theory of deference that takes history seriously 
would overlook it.87  Even if Congress had established the historical 
record claimed for it by the Court, there is always a question of 
whether legislators have proven faithful to that record in this instance.  
While it cannot be known why the Court would ignore the history of 
the enactment before it, there is a basis for the question of whether 
the majority knew that it was unhelpful to its cause:  that it would not 
support “deference” on the basis of Congress’s attention to the dan-
gers of corruption under the Buckley framework. 
B.  The Unofficial History 
As noted above, the Court views the history of campaign finance 
reform as one of “steady improvement” in the law achieved by con-
gressional concern with ever-evolving corruption threatened by the 
role of money in politics.88  The changes made are appropriately 
86 Id. at 681. 
87 See infra notes 127-139 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history 
of BCRA). 
88 See supra text accompanying note 83; McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 634. 
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“cautious” and incremental, as Congress proceeds deliberately to ad-
just regulation with some precision to the fulfillment of its anticorrup-
tion goals.89
On its face, this might seem like a fairly simplified, if not glorified, 
version of how legislation of any kind is made.  It is all the more ques-
tionable as an account of Congress’s engagement with campaign fi-
nance reform.  Rather than illustrating a Congress objectively pursu-
ing the cleansing of political life, campaign finance reform history 
reveals a series of highly partisan disputes over the control of political 
resources.  The “Congress” enacting reforms typically does so from 
distinct partisan or self-interested perspectives.90  We need not judge 
one or the other side harshly to accept the highly politicized character 
of reform legislation over the last century. 
Reform history opens with a decisive change in the country’s 
politics, when the “mass democracy” centered on parties gave way to 
increasingly expensive, candidate-centered appeals to voters that re-
quired intensive fundraising and expenditures.91  With the enactment 
of the Seventeenth Amendment, relocating the election of Senators 
from state legislatures to popular choice at the polls, the stresses occa-
sioned by the change in the structure of political competition became 
ever more acute.92  Parties traded accusations over fundraising prac-
tices, and President Theodore Roosevelt’s celebrated support for the 
corporate spending prohibition, the Tillman Act,93 followed accusa-
tions directed against substantial corporate support for his own presi-
dential campaign.94  As Robert Mutch has shown, partisanship influ-
89 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 645 (citing NRWC, 459 U.S. 197 , 209 (1982)). 
90 It is important not to limit the consideration of self-interest to “partisanship,” 
since in an age of weak parties, individual legislators might exhibit self-interest on 
some occasions by supporting measures beneficial to parties, and on others, by enact-
ments helpful to incumbents as a class. 
91 See, e.g., MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS:  THE AMERI-
CAN NORTH 1865-1928 (1988) (outlining the change in the country’s political process). 
92 See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast:  Democracy, Federalism and the Sirens’ Song of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (l997).  Bybee notes how “proponents [of 
the Seventeenth Amendment] had perhaps overlooked that statewide races conducted 
to the electorate rather than to the legislature would prove far more expensive . . . and 
the need for money could only encourage the influence of corporations and political 
machines.”  Id. at 541. 
 93 Pub. L. No. 59- 36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
(1988)). 
94 See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND THE COURTS:  THE MAKING 
OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1-4 (1988) (outlining the evolution of campaign 
finance law in the twentieth century).  Mutch has produced the only comprehensive 
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enced both the shape and success of most of the subsequent “im-
provements” debated by the Congress,95 such as the original Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).96
Yet the legislative jockeying over the Tillman Act and the FCPA 
does not capture the full partisan flavor of the early wrangling over 
campaign finance reform.  Congress, acting pursuant to its constitu-
tional authority to judge the returns of its Members,97 entertained and 
acted through the investigative process on allegations of campaign fi-
nance violations.98  Louise Overacker, writing about this process, wel-
comed whatever measure of enforcement it afforded, but lamented 
the “tendency” of many cases to “become . . . more and more ill-
disguised attempts to make political capital.  Composed as they are of 
partisans operating in the heat of a campaign, it would be stranger if it 
were otherwise.”99  She noted that the Senate, in enforcing primary 
spending limits, simply adopted “whatever standards it chooses to ap-
ply at the particular time and for the particular candidate”—an exam-
ple of “special legislation with a vengeance.”100  These investigations 
produced reports of their findings and conclusions that are replete 
with evidence of partisan conflict.101  In some instances, such as the 
celebrated challenge to the 1918 Senate election of Truman New-
treatment of the history of campaign finance reform, and any student of this period is 
fortunate to be able to consult his work. 
95 Democrats, particularly Southern Democrats, resisted the restoration of regula-
tion to primary campaigns previously invalidated by the Supreme Court in Newberry v. 
United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), but were actively concerned with the superior 
sources of Republican financing.  They were open to spending limits and pre-election 
reporting.  Republicans advocated regulation of primaries, and sought to maneuver 
the Democrats into public embarrassment on disclosure issues.  See MUTCH, supra note 
94, at 8-16. 
 96  Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). 
97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each house shall be the Judge of the Elections, 
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”). 
98 The FCPA did not establish an independent civil enforcement mechanism and 
the law did not in any event reach primaries in the wake of Newberry.  For a general re-
view of the enforcement “cases” heard by the Senate, see ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY 
WOLFF, GPO, UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES 1793-
1990 (1995). 
99 LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 286 (1932). 
100 Id. at 284. 
101 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENTIAL, 
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL, AND SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES, REP. NO. 79-101, at 83-
84 (l945) (noting the sharply divergent views between the majority and minority over 
the treatment of the union spending, with the minority decrying “the problem of labor 
unions in partisan politics,” while the majority defends their right to participate in the 
“free discussion of political questions”). 
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berry, the candidate’s fortunes rose and fell with changes in party con-
trol of the Senate.102
This partisan coloration persisted throughout the balance of twen-
tieth-century reform.  The l940 Hatch Act,103 limiting political activities 
involving federal government workers, was designed by Republicans 
and anti-New Deal Democrats to undermine President Roosevelt’s 
campaign for nomination to a third term.104  Congress was careful in 
this statute to exempt from coverage state government workers “who 
were still an important source of congressional campaign funds.”105  
President Roosevelt vetoed the bill, but Congress, overriding the veto, 
enacted the restrictions into the law.  A presidential veto, subsequently 
overridden by Congress, also followed enactment of the Smith-
Connally Act106 in l943 which added a prohibition on labor election-
related spending to the 1907 Tillman Act.107
Reforms later in the century follow the same pattern,108 with the 
possible exception of the l974 amendments to the Federal Election 
102 Newberry’s seat, the “control” seat in a closely divided Senate, was bitterly con-
tested along party lines over excessive expenditures on Newberry’s behalf.  Republi-
cans reported in Newberry’s favor to the Senate, over Democratic objections, and the 
Republican-controlled Senate seated him.  When the l922 election reduced the Repub-
lican majority, shifting functional control to Democrats and “independent” or “radical” 
Republicans, it became clear that the Democrats would seek again to remove him, and 
likely succeed.  Newberry then resigned in the face of the inevitable.  See generally 
SPENCER ERVIN, HENRY FORD VS. TRUMAN H. NEWBERRY:  THE FAMOUS SENATE ELEC-
TION CONTEST (l935).  Ervin strongly criticizes the process by which Newberry was 
driven from the Senate, but his account, while partial in this fashion, is rich in detail 
about the politics of the case. 
 103 See Act of July 19, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, § 4, 54 Stat. 767, 767 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982)), (amending Hatch Act, Hatch Act, Pub. L. No. 76-
252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1503, 7324-7327 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); 18 U.S.C. §§ 594, 595, 598, 600, 601, 604, 605 (1982))).
104 MUTCH, supra note 94, at 32-33. 
105 Id. at 34. 
 106  Smith-Connally Act, §9, 57 Stat. 167-68 (1943) (terminated 1946). 
107 See MUTCH, supra note 94, at 154.  Republicans and Southern Democrats 
sought to work around the hostile territory of the Labor Committee, which would 
normally have considered this legislation.  The bill was assigned instead to Military Af-
fairs, which held no hearings, but “assigned it to a specially appointed subcommittee 
consisting entirely of Republicans and Southern Democrats.”  Id. at 153-54.  The bill 
was then moved into typescript, without prior distribution, to the floor where “virtually 
no one in the chamber knew what was being debated.”  Id. at 154. 
108 Mutch notes how even the New York Times expressed concern over the Democ-
rats’ sudden embrace of public financing in l971, in the aftermath of the l968 presi-
dential election that left the party in deep debt with limited prospects for raising 
money.  Id. at 121.  Moreover, the l971 law placed specific limits on spending for 
broadcast media, inspired by Democratic resentment of President Nixon’s purportedly 
unprecedented use of Madison Avenue advertising techniques as related in a best 
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Campaign Act of l971,109 which was enacted in the shadow of Water-
gate.110  It should be apparent that the actual history of the war on 
“corruption” does not correspond very neatly with the pristine ac-
count of the McConnell Court. 
C.  The “Political Realities” 
The McConnell Court also offered a view of the relevant “political 
realities” centered on the corruptive potential, effect and appearance 
of money in the political process.111  Its examples included “manipula-
tions of the legislative calendar” that are claimed to have resulted in 
“Congress’ failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legisla-
tion, tort reform, and tobacco legislation.”112  Yet the Court chose a 
very partial view of the realities bearing on any evaluation of campaign 
finance reform.  Other prominent realities, treated cursorily by the 
Court, involve the efforts of elected officials to protect themselves po-
litically (in a period of sharply increasing campaign costs and weak po-
litical parties) and doing so successfully (reflected in incumbent re-
election rates).  In short, these are the realities of the contemporary 
political marketplace.  Some would say that these realities have been 
well established, much better established than the sweeping generali-
zations the Court justified in the name of “common sense.”113  As a re-
sult, these realities provide a background to the enactment of BCRA 
much different than the one highlighted by the Court. 
seller entitled The Selling of the President 1968.  JOE MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE 
PRESIDENT 1968 (l969).  Thus, House Subcommittee Chairman Torbert MacDonald 
opened hearings on the law by describing its purpose as one of ending “abuse of the 
broadcasting media by candidates for public office” through “saturation” communica-
tions campaigns that sold them like “soap, razor blades, or soft drinks.”  Bills to Regulate 
the Use of Communications Media by Candidates for Elective Public Office: Hearings on H.R. 
8627, H.R. 8628 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. 1 (l971) (statement of Representative Torbert 
H. MacDonald, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Communications and Power). 
 109 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 443, 88 
Stat. 1263 (1974) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-
225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (2003))). 
110 The vote on the l974 amendments was still strongly affected by partisan divi-
sions.  A motion to recommit in the House, though defeated, received considerable 
Republican support with the vote of 243-164.  The margin widened considerably on 
final passage, 355-48, but this vote was held in the extraordinary environment of the 
day before President Nixon’s resignation from office.  H.R. 16090, 93d Cong., 120 
CONG. REC. 27512-13 (1974)(enacted). 
111 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. 624, 665 (2003). 
112 Id. at 664. 
113 Id. at 665. 
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A fair assessment of those realities would have to include refer-
ence to the generally increased cost of campaigning, not merely the 
“explosion” in the amount of soft money.  As Alan Ware pointed out 
twenty years ago, one of the main effects of this increased cost over 
time has been to diminish the role of parties relative to that of the in-
dividual candidate raising money and directing her own political for-
tunes.114  These developments have entailed high incumbent reelec-
tion rates, beginning in the l960s and rising steadily over the years,115 
along with a stark decline over time in party identification.116
The significance of incumbency and incumbency politics, in what 
may be fairly called a post-party age, gave rise in the last decade to a 
robust, nationwide term limits movement predicated on the notion 
that incumbents had a stranglehold on political competition.117  The 
Court was well familiar with these “realities,” having been called upon 
to adjudicate the constitutionality of the nationwide drive toward con-
gressional term limits in Thornton.118  The Court also had experience 
with the increasingly sophisticated management of political competi-
tion for the House, accomplished through computer-aided gerryman-
dering119 and limiting the range of competitive races. 
114 ALAN WARE, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1940-
1980, at 175-76 (l985). 
115 Id. at 146-47. 
116 See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER:  PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN AN 
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 24-25 (2002)(detailing the decline of party-centered politics and 
the rise of candidate, rather than party, identification within the electorate). 
117 See, e.g., JOHN FUND & JAMES COYNE, CLEANING HOUSE:  AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN 
FOR TERM LIMITS, at xix (1992) (examining the tradition of term limits and concluding 
that they can be a method of “reviving political competition and making legislatures 
more responsive to and representative of the people”); GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION:  
CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, at xix 
(1992) (tracing the history of term limits movements and arguing in favor of term lim-
its). 
118 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).  It bears mention that 
Justice Stevens, joint author with Justice O’Connor of McConnell, wrote the majority 
decision in Thornton holding state imposed Congressional term limits unconstitutional.  
Unlike his opinion in McConnell, Justice Stevens decided Thornton on broad constitu-
tional principles with no mention of the “political realities” shaping states’ adoption of 
term limits.  Cf. Colorado Republican II, 533 U.S. at 451-452, 452 n.14 (stating that the 
Court had “long recognized Congress’s concern with [the] reality of political life” that 
“[p]arties are . . . necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is . . . 
to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even 
to support any candidate who will be obliged to the contributors”). 
119 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (evaluating the methodology 
behind the creation of an irregularly shaped majority-black district in North Carolina); 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 635-36 (1993) (examining two unusually shaped, majority-
black districts in North Carolina); see generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 
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In an opinion devoted to an explication of political reality, this re-
ality, bearing directly on the Court’s theory of deference, merited as 
much emphasis as the “subtle” effects of money on the legislative pro-
cess.  While the theory of “deference” is specifically conditioned on 
sensitivity to such “constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents 
to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge,”120 McConnell 
fails altogether to seriously consider what Samuel Issacharoff and 
Richard Pildes refer to as this “background structure of partisan com-
petition.”121  The Court in McConnell, merely nodding in the direction 
of these issues, chose to emphasize one aspect of political reality—the 
standing concern with fundraising—to the exclusion of a more inte-
grated assessment of the operation of the political market. 
This is another way in which the commitment to Buckley’s anticor-
ruption rationale framework limits the Court’s field of vision, eventu-
ally undermining the credibility of its appeal to “deference.”  The fo-
cus on corruption draws the Court’s attention away from a more 
extensive inquiry into the political market.  Narrowing the Court’s fo-
cus, it also screens from the Court’s view other aspects of political real-
ity that would justify judicial supervision of the regulation of politics.  
Issacharoff and Pildes call for courts to assess campaign finance re-
form “intensively to ensure they do not further entrench bipartisan 
political lockups.”122  Yet it is difficult to see how courts could dis-
charge this responsibility under a corruption-centered theory of def-
erence like the one constructed in McConnell. 
D.  The Court’s Treatment of BCRA’s Legislative History 
The Court in McConnell offers the surprising observation that 
there is “little legislative history regarding BCRA generally.”123  To the 
extent that this statement is correct, it would provoke concerns about 
(2004) (considering a claim of partisan gerrymandering and finding it nonjusticiable); 
MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS AND BULLWINKLES:  HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE 
ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS (2001) (examining the ways 
in which district boundaries “can serve or disadvantage political parties, incumbents, 
and racial or ethnic groups”). 
120 Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 402. 
121 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648, 670 (l998).  Pildes and Issacharoff 
place their emphasis on examination of political “realities” in lieu of “mechanical legal 
formalisms” to address the partisan lockup of the political process.  Id. at 652, 660. 
122 Id. at 689. 
123 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 681.  See also supra text accompanying note 86 (noting 
the McConnell Court’s dismissive approach to the legislative history of BCRA). 
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any theory of deference, which should include some reasonable ex-
pectation that elected officials would declare and explain their pur-
poses.  There is, however, significant BCRA legislative history, but the 
Court pays it little attention, citing legislative history on relatively 
modest issues of statutory interpretation.124  The Court resolutely 
avoids any larger-scale engagement with the legislative history in the 
assessment of what the Buckley Court referred to as the “full sweep of 
the legislation as enacted.”125
Justice Scalia in his dissent brings out some of what the majority 
overlooks.  Namely, Justice Scalia provides considerable commentary 
from the House and Senate floors about the personal disdain for 
“attack ads” behind members’ support for the Title II “electioneering 
communications.”126  The Court’s disregard for Congress’s debate on 
BCRA goes further still, ranging over Title I and the statute as a whole.  
The legislative history that the majority derides as “little” includes ex-
tensive debate about the enactment of protections against millionaire 
spending, or increased “hard money” limits, and about the purposes 
to serve the interests, or address the anxieties, of incumbents.  In ad-
dressing the Millionaire’s Amendment, Senator McCain, one of the 
two key sponsors of the bill and a supporter of the amendment, was 
blunt in describing the motives of his colleagues: 
So [the Millionaire’s Amendment] addresses, in all candor, a concern 
that virtually any nonmillionaire Member of this body has, and that is 
that they wake up some morning and pick up the paper and find out 
that some multi-millionaire is going to run for their seat, and that person 
intends to invest 3, 5, 8, 10, now up to $70 million of their own money in 
order to win.
127
Expressing skepticism, both the Democratic Leader and the rank-
ing Democratic Member of the Rules Committee noted that the plain 
effect of the measure was “incumbent protection.”128  The measure 
passed comfortably, with the support of the bill’s sponsors and on a 
124 See, e.g., id. at 684 n.71 (citing Senator Feingold’s statement regarding the abil-
ity of federal candidates to appear in the advertisements of state candidates for the 
purpose of endorsing them). 
125 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 n.33. 
126 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting);  see also Brief for Appel-
lants The National Rifle Association, et al., at 50 app. McConnell v. FEC (no. 02-1675) 
(quoting from BCRA’s legislative history). 
127 147 CONG. REC. S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain) 
(emphasis added). 
128 147 CONG. REC. S2542 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd); 147 
CONG. REC. S2542, 2544 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Daschle). 
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bipartisan basis.  Similar expressions of incumbents’ attention to their 
own welfare surfaced with the introduction of a successful amendment 
to increase the contribution limits for candidates.  The sponsors cited 
many of the same considerations they found persuasive for banning 
“attack ads,” such as the dangers of “independent groups totally taking 
over.”129  Their argument also included an appeal to the advantage, 
associated with increased limits, of reducing the “incessant need for 
fundraising.”130
Not all of these concerns, such as the demands for “incessant 
fundraising,” were constitutionally suspect as a basis for supporting 
congressional action.  Yet a reading of the legislative history reveals 
that once the original bill was presented to the floor, it became the 
subject of adjustment in substantial part on the basis of self-interest.  A 
number of members became uneasy over the spectacle of the Senate 
taking up a reform bill, only to immediately amend it to provide more 
fundraising potential and flexibility for themselves.131
These comments are all the more notable when considered in the 
light of the Senate’s and House’s varied and inconclusive efforts at ar-
ticulating a generally shared view of what the bill was designed to ac-
complish.  Different members argued at different times that the bill 
would provide for “equality” in the political process,132 help to reduce 
the total amount of money in the political process,133 reduce the fund-
raising demands on federal officials,134 and limit negative campaign-
ing.135  Both Democratic and Republican members rejected any sug-
gestion that the bill was required to address actually corrupt conduct, 
129 147 CONG. REC. S3006 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Thomp-
son). 
130 147 CONG. REC. S3012 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
131 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2463 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Levin) (“So the first amendment that comes before the Senate is an amendment which 
is written in a way to eliminate any limit.”). 
132 148 CONG. REC. H342 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Lewis). 
133 See 147 CONG. REC. S2932 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd) 
(“[A]ll of these amendment[s] are just opening up more spigots, allowing more 
money to flow into a process that is already nauseatingly awash in too much money.”). 
134 See 147 CONG. REC. S3012 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein) (arguing that the amendment would “reduce the incessant need for fundrais-
ing”). 
135 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S2692 (daily ed. Mar 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wy-
den) (introducing an amendment to limit negative campaigning). 
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because they agreed that they were not responsible for any.136  In fact, 
Senator Feingold advised his colleagues that they were required to cite 
corruption, regardless of whether it existed, to satisfy the demands of 
the Buckley Court.137  The diversity of views and rationales was such 
that, after Senator Specter introduced an amendment with a “find-
ings” section, in order “to provide a factual basis to uphold the consti-
tutionality of the statute,”138 he subsequently was compelled to with-
draw it when agreement proved impossible.139
The Court’s disinclination to delve into this legislative history is 
evident.  When reviewing the justification for BCRA, the Court de-
votes most of its discussion to the expert testimony presented in the 
proceedings below, and to the findings of the members of the three-
judge court who did not agree among themselves on key issues.140  To 
the extent that Congress’s formal intention is cited, reference is made 
to the Report of the Governmental Affairs Committee on its investiga-
tion of presidential campaign practices,141 which was issued three years 
before and not mentioned at all on the floor of the Senate during the 
first week of debate on BCRA. 
Congress’s varied and sometimes confused record of its purposes, 
not to mention the evidence of self-interestedness that was the topic of 
candid discussion on the floor, may not have been sufficient to doom 
the constitutional character of its enactment.  Still, the Court seemed 
sufficiently uncomfortable with this history to minimize its signifi-
cance and sidestep any serious discussion of the issues it raised, while 
still holding to the proposition that Congress’s will in this matter mer-
ited respect.  This is a troubling feature of a decision committed to a 
notion of judicial deference.  The difficulty follows from the Court’s 
construction of a theory of deference on the basis of historical and 
136 147 CONG. REC. S2936 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone); 
see 147 CONG REC. S2438 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell) 
(commending the lack of unsubstantiated charges of corruption). 
137 See 147 CONG. REC. S2444 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Fein-
gold).  The corruption standard also was subjected to some creative interpretation, 
such as the claim that perceptions of corruption were created somehow by the consti-
tutional right of millionaires to finance their own campaigns without limitation.  147 
CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
138 147 CONG. REC. S3118 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
139 147 CONG. REC. S3120 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
140 See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 649-653 (reviewing the history and purposes of 
BCRA). 
141 Id. at 652-54 (citing SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, INVESTIGA-
TION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELEC-
TION CAMPAIGNS, S. REP. NO. 105-167, 105th Cong. (1998)). 
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empirical claims that do not withstand close scrutiny.  The history, 
“political realities,” and legislative expertise cited by the Court as 
grounds for deference could not benefit from close scrutiny of the ac-
tual process by which BCRA was considered and enacted.  So the 
Court set that legislative history aside. 
CONCLUSION 
If there is a case for deference to the legislature on matters of 
campaign finance, it is not found in McConnell.  The version it offers 
lacks coherence and persuasiveness.  This article has located the fault 
in the Court’s conflicted treatment of Buckley—its desire to escape 
Buckley’s limitations through a theory of deference, and the deleteri-
ous effects on that theory of a continued, albeit weakened, commit-
ment to the Buckley framework.  Buckley has long haunted campaign 
finance reform, but in its strong version, it drew some manageable 
and relatively clear lines.  In its compromised form today, it cannot 
hold its place as a meaningful framework for campaign finance regu-
lation.  The doctrine of deference articulated by the Court will not 
help the Court navigate around Buckley.  In fact, McConnell “defer-
ence” is not the solution, but rather an illustration of the continuing 
problem with Buckley jurisprudence in its twilight. 
 
